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SUMMARY
In order for a current satellite-based navigation system (such as the Global Positioning
System, GPS) to meet integrity requirements, there must be a way of detecting erroneous
measurements, without help from outside the system. This process is called Fault Detection
and Isolation (FDI). Fault detection requires at least one redundant measurement, and can be
done with a parity space algorithm. The best way around the fault isolation problem is not
necessarily isolating the bad measurement, but finding a new combination of measurements
which excludes it.
BACKGROUND
The objective of fault detection and isolation is to use inconsistencies in redundant
sensor measurement data to detect and isolate sensor malfunctions. If a given single
measurement is in error, it will cause the navigation solution to be in error, possibly greater
than the allowable error threshold. Outside sources may not be able to broadcast in a timely
manner that a signal is in error; for instance, if a single GPS satellite malfunctions, it could
be from 15 minutes to several hours before the information is made public in the satellite
broadcast data. Therefore, it is imperative for FDI algorithms to be able to detect and
isolate instrument errors using only data from the instruments themselves.
FDI can be implemented in any multisensor navigation system with redundant
measurements. Current work is focusing on satellite navigation using GPS, along with
hybrid systems such as GPS/Loran-C (Long Range Navigation - C) or GPS/IRS (Inertial
Reference System) [3]. FDI used specifically with GPS is also known as RAIM, or Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring [4].
To detect step errors or fast growing ramp errors, a Kalman filter will work well.
However, it will not detect a slow growing ramp error, such as might be caused by a GPS
satellite clock drift. To detect slow growing errors, the Kalman filter algorithm should be
used in parallel with a parity space algorithm.
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PARITY SPACE AND ESTIMATION SPACE
Estimation space contains the actual horizontal measurement error and the alarm
threshold for a given error. However, actual positions and actual errors are not known,
given that all of the measurement data is coming from imperfect sensors. Therefore, the
work of detecting and isolating errors is done in parity space. Parity space is a mathematical
tool where measurement noise and biases are used to create a parity vector. The parity
vector determines the detection statistic, dk, which is compared to a detection threshold, To,
in order to determine whether an alarm condition exists.
Errors and biases in parity space and estimation space are related, but it is not a one
to one correspondence. The exact correspondence will be determined by measurement
geometries. For instance, with a good geometry, a large measurement error (parity space)
will result in only a small position error (estimation space). The reverse can also be true.
Figure 1 illustrates two different slow growing ramp errors plotted in parity space versus
estimation space. In case I, the detection threshold is crossed before the alarm threshold,
yielding a false alarm. As the error continues to grow, the alarm threshold is crossed,
turning it into a correct fault detection. In case II, the alarm threshold is crossed before the
detection threshold, resulting in a missed detection. As the error continues to grow, the
detection threshold is crossed, turning it into a correct fault detection. An ideal algorithm
would minimize both the number of false alarms and missed detections.
LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATOR ALGORITHM
In a least-squares approach to fault detection, the relationship between the
measurements and the user state (position) is given by:
= H_ (1)
where: 2_ = measurement vector (n-by-l)
H = data matrix (n-by-m)
II = user state vector (m-by-l)
2£ is a vector of n measurements, one from each instrument. In the case of using only
GPS satellites, it would consist of the pseudoranges, f; is the m-element user state vector,
consisting of the user position coordinates and other navigation state elements such as clock
offset with respect to GPS time. H is an n-by-m matrix which relates the measurements to
the user states.
There are three possible cases:
1) n < m : Underdetermined system
2) n = m : Exactly determined system
3) n > m : Overdeterminedsystem
In the underdeterminedcase,a navigationsolution is not possible. In the exactly
determinedcase,a navigationsolutionis possible,but fault detectionis not.
Algorithms for managingthe redundantmeasurementsin anoverdeterminedsystem
form thebasisof fault detection. A parity equationcanbe derivedfrom equation1, starting
with a mathematicalmanipulationcalledthe QR factorizationon thedatamatrix H (ref. 2):
H -- QR (2)
H is factored into an n-by-n orthonormal matrix Q (QTQ = I) and an n-by-m upper
triangular matrix R. R contains (n-m) rows of zeros along the bottom, due to the n-m
redundant measurements in H. Substituting QR for H in equation (1) gives:
= QR_
Q'r_ = Q'rQR _
Qr_ = R__
(3)
Now partition R into an m-by-m upper triangular matrix U and (n-m) rows of zeros, denoted
by 0. Similarly, partition QT into QI (m-by-n) and Q2 ((n-m)-by-n rows).
(4)
The least squares navigation state solution is:
U is an upper triangular matrix.
elements on the diagonal must be non-zero.
equation always has a solution.
The parity equation is:
,0_ = U-1Ql_: (5)
Due to the nature of the QR factorization, all matrix
Therefore, U is always non-singular and this
Q2_ = 0 (6)
The measurement vector _ contains noise (e) and measurement biases (b_). If _ is replaced by
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(_ - e - b), the 0 in equation (6) can be replaced by the parity vector 12.
= Q2_ - Q2 g - Q2 _
= -Q2 g - Q2 b
(7)
Thus, a parity vector will be determined by the noise and bias errors. From the parity
vector, it can be determined whether an instrument is in error and an alarm should be raised.
PARITY SPACE AND DETECTION PROBABILITIES
Considera situation with one redundant......... measurement. In this cas e, the parity vector
will be reduced to a scalar, and the detection statistic reduces to the absolute value of the
scalar. In the case where no measurement bias exists, figure 2 shows the distribution of the
parity scalar. Since there is no bias error, the position error is definitely under the alarm
threshold and the system is either in the normal operation condition or the false alarm
condition. The probability of a false alarm (PEA) is obtained by integrating the areas outside
of To. For noise having a normal distribution (generally a good assumption), this integral is
a standard Gaussian function. ._
Figure 3 illustrates the case where a large measurement bias exists, making the
position error larger than the alarm threshold. In this case the system is either in the correct
fault detection condition or in the missed detection condition. The probability of a missed
detection (P_) is the integral of the area inside Tt,. Again, if Gaussian noise is assumed, this
is a standard Gaussian function.
PROTECTION RADIUS
The above example uses detection threshold, measurement noise, and measurement
bias error as parameters to find PFA and PMD. Accuracy requirements are stated in a form
like "the probability of exceeding 100 meters accuracy is no greater than 0.05". In order to
compare FDI results with such specifications, it helps to rearrange the procedure. This
means using the parameters alarm threshold, measurement noise, PrA, and PMD to determine
the protection radius, which is the smallest horizontal position error that is guaranteed to be
detected with the given probabilities. If all parameters are kept constant, the protection
radius will vary only as a function of satellite geometry.
The method resulting in the best protection radius uses all satellites in view.
However, many receivers are limited to six channels and are incapable of using more than
six measurements. A way around this is to search all possibilities of combinations of 5 or 6
satellites for the set with the best geometry, and use that set to find the protection radius.
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Figure 4 showsa comparisonof eachmethodfor a given locationover the spanof one day.
The parameters used to generate these plots are: a = 32 meters, PF^ = 6.67 x 105, and
Puo = 3.3 x 10 -9.
Since all aircraft carry a baroaltimeter, this can be used as another instrument to
improve the algorithm. The altimeter adds another measurement without requiring more
channels. The altimeter measurement is weighted according to its accuracy and the phase of
flight. Figure 5 shows the effect of altimeter aiding, using the same parameters as before
and an altimeter with statistics identical to the GPS satellites.
FAULT ISOLATION
The fault isolation problem is very difficult. Previous work explored fault isolation
using both a snapshot method and a time history method. Since the objective is to ensure
that the aircraft is flying with a set of good measurements, it is not necessary to isolate the
bad measurement. It is only required that the bad measurement is not used in the navigation
solution. With this in mind, Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) was devised.
In FDE, once an alarm is raised, the algorithm discards the present combination of
satellites and looks for the combination with the next-best geometry. If this set also raises
the alarm, the algorithm goes on to the next best set. Once a set is found that doesn't raise
the alarm, that set is used from then on for navigation. In this manner, the bad satellite is
not necessarily isolated, but it is excluded.
CONCLUSIONS
A fault detection algorithm for a multisensor navigation system has been presented.
A protection radius has been calculated using several different algorithms, with the best-of-
six plus altimeter aiding method being chosen as the best method that will work with all
receivers. The fault isolation problem has been bypassed by using fault exclusion. The only
remaining work for the algorithm is to program it into a receiver and flight test it.
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Figure 1. Two slowly growing measurement errors plotted in parity space
versus estimation space.
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Figure 3. Probability density function for the parity scalar in the presence of a
measurement bias error.
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Figure 4. Worst Case Protection Radius (36N 140E)
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Figure 5. Worst Case Protection Radius (36N 140E)
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